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This article discusses the possibility that Lexical Integrity effects can be explained by proposing that 
words are syntactic phases, thus eliminating these effects from the set of phenomena that argue in 
favour of the autonomy of morphology. The proposal is discussed from both a theoretical and an 
empirical perspective, and it is shown, in the first place, that the phases proposed to give account of 
some of these phenomena do not behave like syntactic phases and, secondly, that syntactic phases 
would be insufficient to cope with the impossibility of pronominal coreference with word internal 
constituents. It is concluded that, given our present understanding of syntax, Lexical Integrity effects 
still argue for the autonomy of morphology. 
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1. THE AUTONOMY OF MORPHOLOGY 
 
In the debate about whether morphology is an independent domain in the human 
language capacity or it can be reduced to syntax, a great deal of research has been 
devoted to the question of whether word formation can be dealt with using the 
standard syntactic operations and by appealing to the general syntactic concepts of 
head, complement and specifier. Most of the research done in Distributed 
Morphology (Halle & Marantz, 1993) and other frameworks where word formation is 
claimed to take place in syntax have tried to argue that category-changing affixes are 
heads that, through syntactic merge, take their bases as their complements (Marantz, 
1997; Marvin, 2008, among many others), while prefixes have been argued to be in 
specifier or adjunct positions (DiSciullo, 2005).  
This debate has not paid sufficient attention, in our opinion, to the fact that, 
even if we grant the assumption that word formation might be reducible to the 
common syntactic operations and relationships, other properties of words can argue 
just as strongly in favour of the autonomy of morphology. This article concentrates in 
one of these aspects and argues that, given our present understanding of syntactic 
operations, there are word phenomena that cannot be successfully reduced to syntax 
and, thus, there is still empirical evidence that morphology can be an autonomous 
component of grammar. In other words, this article provides evidence –if only 
negative evidence- in favour of Lexicalism. 
 
1.1. Sources of evidence for the autonomy of morphology 
 
Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that there is a way in which the structural 
relations among morphemes can be explained by syntactic means. This would not 
mean that syntax and morphology are not distinct. Of course, in this hypothetical 
situation, the proposal that the only generative component is syntax could be more 
likely, but at face value the only thing that this discovery would argue for is that word 
formation uses the same primitive operations and relationships as syntax to generate a 
new structure. There is no logical contradiction in accepting this and, at the same 
time, claiming that morphology is a distinct component. Furthermore, the kind of 
evidence that would preserve the autonomy of morphology in this scenario is very 
clear to identify. This evidence would come from three different sources: 
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a) The existence of pre-syntactic differences in the primitives used by syntax 
b) The existence of units whose distribution cannot be explained by syntactic, 
phonological or semantic means 
c) The existence of domains where syntax cannot operate and which cannot 
be explain through syntactic means 
 
In this article, we will argue in favour of the third source of evidence, and we 
will show that the recent attempts, inside the Minimalist Program, to contradict this 
evidence on the basis of a purely syntactic account of domains are theoretically 
problematic and, more importantly, empirically inadequate. But first, we would like to 
say a few words about the other two kinds of evidence, to suggest that, given our 
present understanding of the theory of grammar, they are also likely to exist, 
potentially supporting the autonomy of morphology in an even stronger way. 
 
1.1.1. Interpretable and non interpretable features 
 
Consider the first source of evidence, namely the existence of syntactically-
unpredictable differences in the features manipulated by syntax. In the Minimalist 
Program, there is crucial difference considered to be standard between two kinds of 
features: interpretable and uninterpretable. The difference between them is that the 
first are introduced into syntax already with a value, which allows them to be 
interpreted by the phonological and the semantic interfaces without any further 
operations (Chomsky, 1995). The second are inserted in syntax without any value. 
This forces them to enter into an agreement relationship with an interpretable feature 
before they can be interpreted by the interfaces. The distinction is approached in 
subsequent work (Chomsky, 2001) in terms of valued and unvalued features, where 
unvalued substitutes uninterpretable, in order to avoid look forward problems that 
were also shared by other previous feature distinctions (such the dichotomy between 
weak and strong features). This change avoids the look forward problem because now 
syntax does not need to know if something will be read at the interfaces; instead, it 
will automatically see if a head contains features in need of valuation and in that case 
it will immediately perform a syntactic operation as soon as it is available. Even in 
this reformulation (see Chomsky, 2004: 113-116), two crucial aspects of this 
distinction between kinds of features make it a source of evidence for the autonomy 
of morphology. The first one is that whether a head contains a valued or an unvalued 
feature is not decided by the syntax, but by the lexicon that lists the heads available in 
a language altogether with its lexical properties, including what kinds of features they 
contain. This sense of lexicon -called ‘narrow lexicon’ in Distributed Morphology, 
which, as a framework, is generally compatible with Minimalist assumptions- is by 
necessity previous to syntax, as it provides it with the primitives to build structures, so 
forcefully it is impossible for syntax to determine or to explain why some features are 
valued and some are unvalued. The second aspect that makes the distinction a source 
of evidence in favour of the autonomy of morphology is that the operations that a 
syntactic structure must undergo are determined by the need to value features which 
did not come out from the lexicon with a value (and therefore are syntactically active; 
Chomsky, 2004: 113). Once that a head with a non interpretable feature is introduced 
in the structure, the syntax cannot change this fact (given the Inclusiveness Condition, 
Chomsky, 1995 and subsequent work) and is forced to undergo at least an agreement 
operation, which is subject to structural constraints. This relation between the 
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(narrow) lexicon and the syntax, by which the first is previous to the second and 
contains syntactically-unpredictable properties which force the syntax to build its 
structures in a particular way is not very different from the situation proposed in 
Lexicalism, by which the pre-syntactic lexicon contains idiosyncratic information that 
forces the syntax to build the tree in a particular way. The difference relates to how 
much information is included pre-syntactically; in principle, Minimalism does not 
include encyclopaedic semantics and phonology in this pre-syntactic lexicon, but 
syntax is still determined by listed properties.  
 
1.1.2. Purely morphological information 
 
The second source of evidence involves the existence of whole grammatical units 
whose nature is not syntactic, phonological or semantic. This situation is well-known 
in the study of natural languages, and it is reflected in the existence of nominal 
desinences (-o in man-o, Spanish and Italian for ‘hand’) and verbal theme vowels (-a 
in cant-a, Spanish and Italian for ‘sing’).  
These units argue in favour of the autonomy of morphology at least in two 
ways. The first is that in some languages they must be present in well-formed words, 
even though they do not seem to be playing any syntactic role in the structure. In 
Distributed Morphology, these units are considered ‘dissociated morphemes’, that is, 
morphemes which do not correspond to any position in the syntactic tree and are 
inserted after all syntactic operations have taken place in positions created for the 
occasion; as theme vowels are morphologically distinct from tense, aspect and 
agreement morphemes in a language like Spanish (Arregi and Oltra, 2005), it is not 
obvious how this formant can be accounted for inside any syntactic decomposition of 
the sentential middle field, at least if –as Minimalism requires- all syntactic heads 
have a semantic contribution. In a sense, this technical solution implicitly 
acknowledges that the information carried by a theme vowel or a desinence is not 
syntactic in nature.  
The second way in which these units argue for the autonomy of morphology is 
the existence of distinct classes marked by different desinences or theme vowels. This 
means that there is more than one desinence and more than one theme vowel, which 
automatically raises the question of how they are distributed. Given our present 
understanding of these units, their distribution cannot be explained by syntactic 
principles. Take Spanish, where there are three conjugations marked with three 
different theme vowels, as an illustration. In the first, second and third conjugation 
there are transitive (1a) and intransitive (1b) verbs; in all three conjugations there are 
unaccusative (1c) and unergative (1d) verbs. To the best of our knowledge, no 
syntactic difference reflected in the grammatical behaviour of the verbs has been 
identified that can explain the distribution of the three markers. 
 
(1) a. cant-a, beb-e, part-i 
sing-ThV, drink-ThV, break-ThV 
b. sueñ-a, corr-e, viv-i 
dream-ThV, run-ThV, live-ThV 
c. lleg-a, ca-e, sal-i 
arrive-ThV, fall-ThV, go.out-ThV 
d. sangr-a, tos-e, luc-i 
bleed-YhV, cough-ThV, glow-ThV 
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The distribution can also be shown not to be due to phonological properties of 
the base; this is straightforwardly illustrated by the fact that, given the same 
phonological form in the root, two different theme vowels can appear (2). 
 
(2) a. sal-a, sal-i 
salt-ThV, go.out-ThV   
b. cre-a, cre-e 
create-ThV, believe-ThV 
 
Finally, the distribution does not seem semantic either. To the best of my 
knowledge there are no generalizations with respect to the aspectual information, the 
kind of event expressed, or the properties of the argument structure of the verb that 
can explain the distribution of the three theme vowels in Spanish. The same 
observation can be made equally easily with respect to the desinences that mark the 
different noun classes.  
There is of course no logical impossibility that in the future we will reach a 
sufficiently fine-grained understanding of the syntax or semantics of grammatical 
categories which allows us to find a difference which explains the distribution of 
these markers. It is an empirical matter and, as such, it cannot be ruled out by a 
theoretical reasoning, but it is at the same time clear that, at this point, this 
explanation does not exist and thus there are no reasons to reject the idea that the 
distribution of desinences and theme vowels is determined by purely morphological 
principles -and thus that they are a clear example of morphomes, in Aronoff’s (1994) 
terminology-. 
 
1.1.3. Lexical Integrity effects 
 
Despite the inherent interest of these two sources of evidence, in this article we will 
concentrate on the third source of evidence, the existence of impenetrable domains 
which cannot be explained by syntactic means. This source of evidence is manifested 
in the set of phenomena considered Lexical Integrity effects (after the Lexical 
Integrity Hypothesis, LIH; Lapointe, 1978). Among the well-known phenomena that 
argue in favour of the existence of a domain inside which syntax cannot operate we 
find, most relevantly for this article, the impossibility of extracting constituents from 
inside a word (3b) and the impossibility of having coreference between a pronoun and 
a nominal expression embedded inside a word, even when the grammatical context 
makes it clear that the pronoun denotes a kind, not an individual (3c). (3d) is a control 
example, where we see that reference to kinds is possible for bare nouns when they 
are not part of a word.1 
                                                        
1 An anonymous reviewer suggests that the reason for the ungrammaticality of (3c) might be the same 
one as we see in (i), namely that the noun the pronoun attempts to corefer to is purely predicative 
(giving us a kind of the entity denoted by the head) and thus does not introduce any referent. 
 
(i) Il gatto di casai la*i rallegra 
The cat of house it rejoices  
Intended: The house cat brightens the house 
 
It is clearly appealing to have a common explanation for these phenomena. We would like to suggest 
that also in (i) we have a morphological unit and that cat is not an independent syntactic constituent. 
Notice that the incapacity of the noun to introduce a referent might be a consequence of the syntactic 
configuration, and more in particular of the possibility that it actually forms a (non orthographically 
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(3) a. John is a truck driver. 
b. *[What]i is John a [ti driver]? 
c. John is a trucki driver. It*i is a type of vehicle. 
  d. John does not drink winei because he hates iti. 
 
Notice, first of all, that these are empirical facts independent of any theory. 
Even theories where the limits between morphology and syntax are gradient, like 
Construction Grammar (Goldberg, 1995) and Construction Morphology (Booij, 
2010), acknowledge this difference, which is treated as different levels of cohesion 
inside a construction (Booij, 2010: 94-108). Modern lexicalism has revised the LIH a 
number of times (see Lieber & Scalise, 2006), but all researchers still admit that some 
phenomena show that words (at least some of them) behave like closed domains. At 
present, several researchers, most significantly working in Distributed Morphology, 
have treated Lexical Integrity effects as the effect of a syntactic domain, more 
specifically syntactic Phases. In the next section we will discuss their proposal and its 
theoretical problems, while in the third section we will show why the proposal is 
insufficient to explain data such as those in (3c). 
 
2. WORDS AS PHASES AND LEXICAL INTEGRITY EFFECTS 
 
The strategy adopted by some researchers to contradict the data in (3) as evidence for 
the autonomy of morphology involves defining the word as a syntactic domain. In this 
way, the word would be considered a domain in the same sense as certain kinds of 
phrases are domains. The same set of syntactic principles would explain why 
extraction is impossible in (3b) and in (4b); like that, syntax and morphology would 
be subject to the same principles and the data would not argue for the autonomy of 
morphology. 
 
(4) a. John wonders [who wrote the book]. 
b. *[What]i does John wonder [who wrote ti] 
 
2.1. Syntactic phases 
 
Minimalism recasts the traditional definition of barriers, which introduce limits to 
domains, in terms of phases (Chomsky, 2001), that is, chunks of structure that are 
formally completed and can be transferred to the phonological and semantic 
interfaces. More specifically, the proposal is that syntactic merge proceeds 
derivationally, combining in each step two constituents. At particular points in the 
tree, a part of the structure created by merge has already satisfied all its formal 
properties -mainly in the form of uninterpretable features that have agreed with 
interpretable ones-. At that point, syntax does not have any further operations to 
perform in that chunk of structure, and therefore transfers it so that phonology and 
semantics can interpret it. The conceptual reason for the existence of Phases in 
Minimalism is precisely this one: to remove from the working space a chunk of 
structure which does not need to be manipulated by syntax anymore. The bigger the 
                                                                                                                                                              
represented) word with the preposition; indeed, the whole PP di casa is equivalent to the adjective 
domestic in its meaning, which suggests that the whole PP should be treated as a unit at some level. See 
also §3.2.2. for arguments that even when the noun introduces a referential index coreference is 
impossible. 
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structure contained in the working space, the bigger the computational load that 
comes with it (for instance, the presence of structure exponentially increases the 
number of possible operations that can take place at further steps in the derivation). It 
follows, therefore, that phases have to be transferred as soon as possible, because 
otherwise their existence would not contribute much to facilitating the syntactic 
computation.  
Once a part of the structure has abandoned syntax, it is gone for good, and any 
subsequent syntactic operation will not be able to manipulate any of its members, 
simply because it will not find the chunk of structure in the computational system. In 
the case of the sentence in (4), the explanation to the impossibility of moving the 
second interrogative comes from the fact that this interrogative would be embedded 
inside a phase, that formed by the Complementizer Phrase ([CPwho wrote what]), that 
has been transferred to the interfaces before the interrogative complementizer of the 
main clause ([CP Wh does John wonder]) had any chance to attract it2. In other words: 
the subordinate interrogative clause forms a phase (5a). This phase is transferred, 
including the interrogative what, by the time it is combined with the verb wonder 
(5b); thus, when the higher interrogative CP is built (5c), what is gone, explaining the 
ungrammaticality of (4b), repreated as (5d). 
 
(5) a. [CP who wrote what] 
 b. [vP wonder [CP who wrote what]] 
 c. [CP Wh does John [vP wonder [CP who wrote what]]]   
  d. *[CP Whati does John [vP wonder [CP who wrote ti]]] 
 
2.2. The hypothesis that words are syntactic phases 
 
Marantz (2001) and, more clearly, Arad (2003: 748 and folls.) propose to 
extend this notion of phase to the word domain. The reasoning is the following: a 
root, by hypothesis, does not have a defined grammatical category (6a). As such, it 
will not be able to be transferred to the interfaces, because the lack of a grammatical 
category entails that the semantic component will not be able to assign an 
interpretation to it. However, in a further step, the root combines with a functional 
head, and at this point it receives a grammatical category (6b). At this point, the root 
has satisfied its formal requisite of getting a grammatical category, and the interfaces 
can interpret it. At this point, and only at that point, the structure can be transferred 
because it has satisfied some properties. The proposal is that roots, isolated, have no 
meaning whatsoever; meaning is assigned to them in the context of a functional 
categorizer. In other words: (6a) does not have meaning; (6b) does. 
 
(6)   a. [√] 
b. [xP [√]] 
 
                                                        
2 Our presentation is oversimplified, as constituents are allowed to escape from inside a phase provided 
that movement takes place cyclically. In the case of a CP, the interrogative would need to move to the 
edge –that is, the specifier position- of the head. As only the complement of the head that defines the 
phase gets transferred, but not the head itself of its edge, the constituent would be at that point in the 
required position to undergo further steps of movement. The impossibility of movement in (4) implies 
that the interrogative could not be in the edge of the CP when the phase got completed, presumably 
because of the presence of the interrogative who. The specific technical implementation of this 
ungrammaticality is orthogonal to the purposes of this paper. 
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In Arad (2003), this has consequences for the further steps of the derivation. 
The material contained inside a phase is transferred to the phonology and to the 
semantics. From here it follows that such material will be processed by these 
components as a unit, and, thus, that it will be possible to assign a special semantics 
or phonology to the chunk as a whole. The interest of this step is that it is used to 
explain the semantic and phonological idiosyncrasies found inside the word domain 
and pointed out at least since Chomsky (1970) and Halle (1973). Compare the 
sentences in (7), taken by Arad (2003: 756) from Kiparsky (1982, 1997). 
 
(7)   a. He hammered the nail with a rock. 
b. *Screw the fixture to the wall with nails! 
 
In (7a), the verb to hammer can describe an action performed by using a rock, 
instead of a hammer; in (7b), on the other hand, the verb to screw cannot describe an 
action which involves nails: the action must be performed by using screws. Arad 
proposes that this difference can be explained if the set formed by the root and its 
categorizer forms a phase. Her proposal is that the interpretation assigned to a root in 
the context of the first categorizer cannot be changed in further steps of the derivation 
(Arad, 2003: 747). This follows from the same principles that do not allow extraction 
of what from the sentence in (4b): once a chunk of structure has left the working 
space and has been processed by the interfaces, it becomes insensitive to any 
subsequent structure built in the syntax and to the interpretation associated to it. Let 
us see an illustration of what this proposal can account for. 
In (7a), the verb is constructed over a root √HAMMER; a specific meaning is 
assigned to the set in (8a). When the root materializes as a noun, the set in (8b) gets 
another meaning assigned; the meaning of (8a) does not need to be identical to the 
one in (8b), becase the root does not carry any semantics of its own3. In (7b), in 
contrast, the verb is formed over the noun screw, not over the root √SCREW. The 
verbal head combines with an already complex object, formed by a zero nominalizer 
and the root √SCREW, as represented in (8c). Meaning is assigned first to the set 
formed by the root and the nominalizer (8d), which is the first head that assigns a 
category to the root. By the time the verbalizer is added, the base got a specific 
meaning assigned that the subsequent steps in the derivation cannot change. 
Consequently, the verb to screw is built on the meaning assigned to the noun screw, 
and thus must refer to an action which involves the objects we call ‘screws’. 
 
 (8) a. [v [√HAMMER]] 
b. [n [√HAMMER]] 
  c. [v [n [√SCREW]]]  
d.  [n [√SCREW]] 
 
To summarize the argument, Arad’s proposal is that the root and the first 
categorizer form a phase, and argues that the question of whether a word has an 
idiosyncratic semantics (or phonology) depends on whether the word itself is a phase 
                                                        
3 The attentive reader will probably have noticed already that this procedure of assigning the meaning 
to roots only to the extent that they belong to a syntactic context is reminiscent of constructions in 
Construction Morphology. It is not unfair, we believe, to claim that Arad’s proposal treats basic 
morphological structures –consisting maximally of one root and one categorizer- in the same way as 
constructions in the sense of Goldberg (1995). By definition, in both cases no compositional meaning 
can emerge because the units do not have a meaning in isolation. 
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–in which case idiosyncrasies are possible, as in (7a / 8a)- or whether it contains a 
phase, in which case the meaning of the word must be constructed on top of whatever 
meaning was assigned in the previous step of the derivation, forcing the verb to 
denote an action which involves the particular object interpreted in the base (7b / 8c).  
 
2.2.1. How this proposal could explain the absence of extractions 
 
Imagine that a word is a phase, as proposed by this author. In that proposal we can 
explain the absence of extraction of word constituents just as the failure to extract the 
interrogative in (4) is explained. (9) reproduces the structure of truck driver following 
Harley’s (2009) analysis in the Distributed Morphology framework. Notice that the 
word contains two phases in Arad’s sense: one formed by the constituent truck and 
the first nP, which turns it into a noun, and a second one that dominates the first and 
contains drive and the second nP.  
 
 (9) [nP  -ern [√P DRIVE [nP øn [√P  TRUCK]]]] 
 
If we assume this construction, the fact that truck, or an interrogative 
occupying its position, cannot be extracted from inside the compound by movement 
can be explained by the notion of phase, in the sense used by Arad. The constituent 
truck is contained inside the phase defined by a null categorizer -ø, which in turn is 
contained inside the higher phase defined by -er. Chunks which are word phases 
(containing a root and a categorizer) are in bold.  
This means that once the compound is constructed, the non-head will not be 
able to be extracted simply because it is part of a word phase, and as such it will have 
abandoned the computational system before the syntax can build an interrogative 
sentence. Any constituent occupying the position of truck or, for that matter, any 
constituent below the head -er responsible for categorizing the compound would be 
equally unextractable because of the same reasons. On these assumptions, the reason 
that explains that the interrogative what cannot be extracted from inside the 
compound in (3b) is the same that explains that who cannot be extracted from inside 
the subordinate clause in (4b): they are constituents embedded on a phase, and they 
are transferred out of the computational system before movement can take place.  
 
2.3. Against syntactic phases inside words: theoretical problems 
 
The notion of phase is understood in the Minimalist program as a way to minimize the 
information load that the computational system has to cope with. Intuitively, the idea 
is very simple: if there is a chunk of structure which has satisfied all its formal 
requisites, syntax can remove it from the space where the derivation is performed 
because that chunk does not need anything else. ‘Removing it’ implies transferring it 
to further levels, where the semantics and the phonology are performed. It is crucial 
that the chunk of structure which has all its formal properties satisfied is transferred as 
soon as possible; otherwise the whole intuition that underlies the proposal of phases 
would be contradicted, as there will be at least one step in which an operation is 
performed on a structure which contains an unnecessary work load. In consequence, 
every phase is defined by a specific head, which is assumed to have all the formal 
characteristics required to satisfy the formal conditions of the chunk of structure 
which is embedded under it. Consider, for example, the head little v, assumed in 
standard minimalism to be a head that defines a phase (10). 
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 (10)  [vP [DP1] v0 [VP V0 [DP2]]] 
 
Little v is assumed to carry a set of formal features which, by a form of 
agreement, can check the case needed by DP2 in (10), which corresponds to the direct 
object of a transitive verb. Before little v is introduced in the syntactic tree, DP2 has 
still a formal property in need of satisfaction, its case. As soon as little v is introduced 
in the tree, it automatically uses its formal features to satisfy the case of the direct 
object, and the structure is defined as a phase. But which chunk of structure is 
transferred to the interfaces, therefore making its constituents unavailable for 
movement? It is standardly accepted that the chunk is the complement of v0, but not v0 
itself or its specifier; the head and its specifier(s) –known as the ‘edge’ of the phase- 
remain in the derivation as the former is necessary for further selection by higher 
heads and the latter are hierarchically higher than the head. In other words, the part 
that abandons syntax is VP, not vP. How do we know this? Because if vP was 
transferred, the DP1 contained in vP would also be eliminated from the syntax. DP1 
corresponds to the agent of a transitive verb, and by assumption, it must check its 
case, for the same reasons that DP2 had to check it. However, it cannot check it with 
v0, because this head has already checked the case of DP2. In other words, DP1 will 
have to wait to further steps of the syntactic derivation in order to get its formal 
properties licensed, and because of that it follows that it cannot be part of the chunk of 
structure transferred to the interfaces. Of course, if DP1, the specifier of vP, cannot be 
transferred, it also follows that v0, the head of vP, cannot be transferred either, 
because it is not possible to transfer a head and leave the phrase that it heads behind. 
The standard minimalist assumptions about phases is that the complement of a phase, 
but not its head or its specifier, is transferred. 
At this point, we need to address the question of whether Arad’s system is 
using exactly this technical notion of phase. The answer seems to us to be negative. 
Arad’s claim that the set formed by the root and its categorizer is technically 
incompatible with the way in which she assigns the semantic interpretation to the 
root, if by phase the author means what is standardly assumed to be a syntactic phase. 
Why? Given the structure in (11), we expect the complement of the head that defines 
the phase to be transferred to semantics, where it gets an interpretation. That 
complement is the root. 
 
 (11) [v [√HAMMER]]  
 
However, the author is very clear (Arad, 2003: 747) that roots are assigned an 
interpretation in the environment of the first category-assigning head. This is crucial 
to explain the difference in meaning between a hammer and to hammer. The root does 
not have a stable semantics, that is, the root does not have any semantics of its own 
(see also Acquaviva, 2008). It is rather the structure in (12a) and the structure in (12b) 
that get a semantics assigned.  
 
(12) a. [n [√HAMMER]] = ‘tool consisting of a solid head set crosswise on 
a handle’ 
 b. [v [√HAMMER]] = ‘to beat something using a blunt instrument’ 
 
However, the proposal that (11) constitutes a phase entails that the constituent 
transferred to the semantics will only be the root, and therefore it would be the root, 
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alone, that would get a meaning assigned. Notice that, as far as the interfaces are 
concerned, the object that arrives to them is only a root, without any sign of it having 
been combined with a categorizer in the syntax4. This is difficult to reconcile with the 
fact that the semantics does not assign any semantics directly to the root, but rather to 
the complex structures in (11). If only the root was transferred, the semantics will not 
be able to know if the root appears in a verbal or a nominal context, as a phase-
defining head such as little v is not transferred as part of the phase. This, of course, 
does not mean that Arad’s analysis is not a possible explanation of the empirical 
contrasts that she discusses, but rather that the domain that she is describing does not 
behave like a standard syntactic phase such as the one discussed in (10). 
Notice, however, that in order to account for the contrast in (7), the proposal 
needs either that the root is not transferred when the phase is completed or that the 
assignment of a semantic interpretation is delayed in the interfaces until the following 
phase is completed and its domain, including the categorizer, transferred. In the first 
case, useless material remains in the syntax –unnecessarily loading the computational 
system-; in the second case, material stays in the interfaces without getting any 
interpretation, and on top of it we need to motivate in a non arbitrary way how many 
transferences the interfaces are willing to wait before they decide to get their work 
done. Either way, we go against economy conditions.    
From this perspective, it seems that, even if Arad’s proposal was right and it 
could be extended to explain the impossibility of extracting constituents from inside 
words, that explanation would not constitute evidence that Lexical Integrity effects 
can be explained by the syntactic notion of phase. This is due, quite simply, to the fact 
that the phase used in the analysis does not display the expected behaviour of a 
syntactic phase. Assuming that her analysis is right, it provides evidence for a 
different kind of domain. It is still to be determined whether this domain is 
morphological in nature, in which case the proposal would actually provide us with 
evidence in favour of the autonomy of morphology.  
 
3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AGAINST ANALYZING WORDS AS PHASES: 
ANAPHORIC ISLANDS 
 
In the previous section we have discussed the possibility that words can be defined as 
syntactic domains with the aim of eliminating the impossibility of movement from the 
set of phenomena that argue for the autonomy of morphology. We have seen that the 
proposal has theoretical problems and that it is not clear that the notion of domain 
used there is the one proposed in minimalist syntax. However, all these considerations 
would not be necessary if we find an empirical phenomenon that could not be 
explained by syntactic principles even if we assumed that words constitute phases. 
This section is devoted to presenting these well-known data, and our contribution to 
the debate is that we will show that, given our present understanding of syntax, they 
still argue in favour of the autonomy of morphology. 
                                                        
4 To the best of my understanding, any procedure that wants to enforce that, when the root arrives alone 
to the interfaces, it carries the memory that it has been combined with a specific categorizer require 
some form of feature checking between the root and the functional head it combined with. However, 
this would mean that roots, in the lexicon, would already been provided with features that state which 
categorizers can combine or cannot combine with them, which is a form of denying in practice one of 
the basic assumptions of DM, namely that roots are not paired with any categorial information 
whatsoever in the lexicon. Thus I consider this procedure inconsequent with the other assumptions in 
the system and I will not consider it here.   
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The source of data comes from anaphoric islands (Postal 1969), namely situations 
where it is impossible to have a pronoun corefering with a word-internal constituent. 
Consider the sentences in (13), taken from Spanish (13a), Norwegian (13b) and 
English (13c). 
 
(13)  a. Juan es [limpia[ventanasi]]. Siempre pro*i están sucias. 
    Juan is clean-window. Always pro are dirty. 
    ‘Juan is windowi-cleaner. They*i are always dirty’  
b. Jan [[håndi] hilste] på Ole. Den*i var våt. 
    Jan hand-greeted on Ole. It was wet. 
    ‘Jan shook Ole’s hand. It was wet’ 
c. John is a [[trucki]driver]. It*i is parked outside. 
 
In all these cases, a pronoun cannot corefer to a noun contained inside a 
compound, independently of the grammatical category of the compound (noun in 13a, 
13c; verb in 13b). The general explanation of this fact is the Lexical Integrity 
Hypothesis: internal constituents of a word are not accessible for syntactic processes. 
Compounds are words, and coreference is a syntactic process dependent on notions 
such as c-command, agreement and syntactic constituency (Lebeaux, 2009 and 
references therein). Consequently, pronouns cannot corefer with internal constituents 
of a word. They can, on the other hand, corefer with whole words, as words are heads 
in syntax. 
 
3.1. Is the generalization accurate? 
 
It has been proposed (Lieber, 1992) that the data in (13) are misleading, and that there 
are instances of word-internal constituents which can be taken as antecedents by 
pronouns. Most famously, (14) illustrates one of these examples.5 
 
(14)  [Reagan]iites no longer agree with himi. 
 
The sentence in (14) allows, at least for some speakers, for an interpretation in 
which the supporters of Reagan no longer agree with Reagan. The question is whether 
this interpretation is enough to determine that the formal antecedent of the pronoun is 
the word-internal constituent Reagan-, used as a base to form the derivate Reaganite. 
An alternative would be to propose that the antecedent of the pronoun is a discourse-
introduced referent which happens to refer to the entity introduced by Reagan, but is 
not the constituent Reagan- contained in Reaganites. Notice that this is independently 
true of pronouns: pronouns can be coreferential with objects not represented in the 
linguistic utterance, provided that their referents where known in the context of 
discourse (15). 
 
(15)  a. Shei has claimed that Maryj is sick. 
b. President Obamai has always tried to oppose themj. 
                                                        
5 As an anonymous reviewer reminds us, since Postal (1969) it has been noted that sentences like those 
in (i), where the pronoun is the direct object of the verbs, are generally worse than those where the 
pronoun is introduced by a preposition. The ultimate reasons is not clear to us. 
 




Both sentences in (15) can be uttered at any point in the discourse, and by 
necessity their reference must be disjoint from the other nominal expression in the 
linguistic context. In (15a), Mary cannot be coreferential with she because that would 
constitute a Principle C infraction, that is, a violation of the principle that states that 
an expression that is by itself referential cannot have a c-commanding coreferential 
constituent. The pronoun she c-commands Mary and, thus, coreference is out. As for 
(15b), coreference is impossible because the features contained in the pronoun are 
different from those contained in the referring expression President Obama; namely, 
the pronoun is plural and the referring expression, singular. The fact is, in any case, 
that the sentences in (15) can be uttered by a speaker at any point in a conversation, 
provided that at that point the referent of the pronouns is discoursively clear. 
Authors like Montermini (2006) have argued that the coreference in (14) is 
pragmatically motivated, among other things because it is improved when the noun is 
actually a proper name, which is strongly referential and involves a salient object in 
the discourse. We will present two grammatical tests that show that Montermini is 
right (and with him, proponents of the pragmatic analysis, like Sproat, 1988). First of 
all, notice the sentence in (16). This sentence can be interpreted as ‘Reagan does not 
believe in the Reagan-ists’. 
 
(16)  He does not believe in the Reaganites. 
 
If the pronoun was coreferring with the word-constituent Reagan-, this 
sentence should constitute a Principle C infraction, for the same reason that (15a) is 
incompatible with coreference: the pronoun c-commands the word constituent 
Reagan-. However, if Reagan- is not the antecedent of the pronoun, no Principle C 
effects would arise: the pronoun gets its reference from the discourse, and Reagan- is 
not acting as an antecedent.  
We believe that another piece of evidence against the coreference between the 
pronoun and the word constituent is provided by the sentence in (17). 
 
(17)  Monarchists around the world no longer believe in them. 
 
Here, a possible interpretation is ‘Monarchists no longer believe in monarchs’. 
The pronoun is plural, but there is no reason at all to propose that the word-
constituent monarch-, contained inside the word monarchist, is formally plural. There 
are no signs of plural morphology in the base, and neither there is in the semantics, as 
indeed the same constituent is compatible with a necessarily singular reading: 
 
(18) The last attempt to restore a monarchist system was a failure. 
 
 Two last comments are in order. First of all, it has to be noticed that the 
availability of these anaphoras is unstable and different speakers report different 
judgements, which often are not clear; Postal (1969) finds ungrammatical examples 
equivalent to those that Lieber (1992) judge acceptable. Secondly, as noticed by 
Montermini (2006), there are morphological factors, involving the semantic and 
formal opacity of the base and the productivity of the process that forms the complex 
word, that can make these anaphoras more acceptable. Despite these interesting 
nuances, which we will not have the space to develop, the crucial fact for our 
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purposes is that in any case there are some complex words which behave as anaphoric 
islands, which is a lexical integrity effect. 
  
3.2. Why Phases are not enough to explain this restriction 
 
The fact is, then, that in a variety of languages, the fact that a noun is contained inside 
a word is enough to preclude coreference with a pronoun. At this point, the question 
that we must ask ourselves is whether this empirical phenomenon is enough to accept 
that there is a special domain, called ‘word’, whose constituents are invisible for 
(some) syntactic operations or it is still possible to explain these facts through some 
notion of syntactic domain, called Phase in the minimalist framework. We believe 
that these data show, indeed, that words must be taken as special domains and the 
theory of syntactic phases cannot explain this pattern without stipulations equivalent 
to accepting that words are special domains different from syntactic phases. 
Let us consider the interaction between phases and the coreference of 
pronouns. Consider the data in (19). 
 
 (19) a. Johni saw himj/*i 
  b. Johni says that Peteri saw himj/*i. 
 
These data show that a pronoun, as opposed to an anaphor, needs its 
antecedent –if it is present in the linguistic context- to be in a phase different from the 
one in which it is included. At the level of the transitive vP, which is a phase, (19a) 
has the structure in (20). 
 
 (20) [vP [John]i  v0 him...]  
 
That is, the antecedent of him is in the same Phase as him, and therefore the 
sentence is ungrammatical. The structure of (19b), where coreference is possible, 
corresponds to (21), ignoring unnecessary details: 
 
 (21) ... [vP  [John]j v0  [CP that ... [vP [Peter]i v0 him]]]      
 
Here the pronoun can be coreferential with the referental expression outside its 
vP phase, and cannot be coreferential with the one inside it. The neat generalization 
that follows from here is that a pronoun needs its antecedent to be in a different phase.  
The distance and the level of embedding of the antecedent are irrelevant, as 
illustrated in (22). (22a) contains an antecedent inside a vP phase contained inside a 
CP relative clause phase inside a DP phase. Coreference is still possible. In (22b) the 
antecedent is embedded in a vP phase inside a CP phase inside a CP relative clause, 
inside a DP in subject position, inside a conditional CP, and this does not preclude 
coreference either. Coreference is possible whenever the antecedent is in another 
phase. 
 
(22) a. [DP The person [CP that Mary introducedv [vP tvto Johni]] already knew 
himi. 
b. [CP If [DP the person [CP that said [CP that sawv [vP tv the documentsi]]]] 
was here], he could describe themi. 
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It is easy to see now why the theory of phases cannot explain the impossibility 
of coreference to a word-internal constituent. Let us assume for one second that a 
word is a phase (represented XP in 23). In that case, a pronoun external to the word 
should be able to corefer to the word-internal constituent, as this will be in a phase 
different than the phase that contains the pronoun, as shown in (23), whose structure 
would be similar to (22a). 
  
 (23) [DP The [XP truck driver]] left it parked outside. 
 
However, it cannot corefer with truck. This is unexpected under the light of 
the data that we have just considered. Provided that the antecedent is in a different 
phase than the pronoun, whatever makes (22) grammatical should make it possible 
that it picks truck as the antecedent in (23). Empirically, this is clearly not so. 
Consequently, a syntactic analysis of words as phases -even if it overcomes 
the problems discussed in the previous sections- would not be able to give account of 
these data. The alternative would be to accept that words are phases with some special 
property that somehow makes them completely opaque to coreference. However, 
once that we forget about the terminology used, this ‘phase with special properties’ is 
nothing more than a domain opaque for some syntactic operations, which is precisely 
the description of what Lexicalism calls a ‘word’. Ignore the terminology for one 
moment: the fact is that this pattern provides evidence for a non-syntactic autonomous 
domain. 
There are other potential alternatives to explain the impossibility of 
pronominal coreference with a word-internal noun in a syntactic framework. One 
possibility would be to say that, in order to be part of a word, the noun must lack 
some functional layers which are independently necessary for being the antecedent of 
a pronoun; these layers can be those that provide a noun with reference or those that 
provide it with an index of identity. Another possibility would be that the noun is too 
embedded inside a structure that can itself be a potential antecedent; this would be a 
standard relativized minimality effect (Rizzi, 1990). In the remainder of this section, I 
will address each one of these alternatives and show why they cannot be adopted. 
 
3.2.1. Why other alternatives do not work: determiners and coreference 
 
One possibility would be to say that the domain created by the word is irrelevant, and 
that coreference is impossible simply because a constituent internal to the word is 
going to lack the relevant syntactic projections that make coreference with a pronoun 
possible. An obvious possibility would be that this domain is the DP.6 This was 
suggested in Fábregas (2005). The reasoning is the following: in order to combine 
two or more heads inside a ‘word’, syntactic incorporation must take place (Baker, 
1988). However, incorporation is syntactically restricted to lexical categories, and as 
such is blocked by the presence of any functional projection, such as DP or TP. 
 
                                                        
6 It is worth mentioning that the DP has been suggested to be also a syntactic phase (Chomsky 2000) 
and that perhaps one would want to say that DPs are necessary to allow something be the antecedent 
for pronouns; for instance, the edge of the DP phase could remain and the transfered constituent 
(NumP or NP) would be transfered to the interfaces, where the antecedent-pronoun relation would be 
computed. However, this section shows that it is not necessary that DPs are built to allow coreference, 
so in the reminder of the section we will not discuss whether DPs are phases, as it is orthogonal to our 
reasoning. 
  14 
 (24) a. [VP V [NP N]] 
  b. [VP V [DP D [NP N]]] 
 
In (24a) the N can incorporate to the V, as they are both lexical categories. In 
(24b), in contrast, N will never incorporate to V because between the two heads there 
is a functional projection, D, which blocks incorporation. The argument goes that if D 
will always block incorporation, only nouns without determiner features will be able 
to be part of a word. On the assumption that a pronoun corefers with a DP and not 
with a noun, it follows that coreference will never be able to pick a constituent of a 
word: if the word could be formed in the first place, that is because there is no DP 
inside it.  
This explanation depends on two assumptions: that words are constructed in 
the syntax via head-movement and that there is a neat distinction between functional 
and lexical heads. Both assumptions are problematic, but we will not discuss their 
problems here, mainly because, on closer inspection, the theory proposed by Fábregas 
(2005) is obviously unable to explain the data independently of these problems. The 
reason is simple: pronouns do not need to corefer with the DPs; they can look inside 
them and corefer with smaller units contained in them (perhaps NP or NumP). 
Consider (25).    
 
 (25) Many linguists believe that they are not taken seriously. 
 
This sentence allows for a reading –indeed, the most natural reading- in which 
the referent of they is not many linguists, but the noun linguists contained in that 
phrase. The most natural interpretation of (25) is that many linguists have the belief 
that linguists –in general- are not taken seriously. This shows, in the first place, that 
the pronoun does not need to take the higher functional projections that dominate the 
noun as its antecedent. What is being taken as the antecedent? One possibility would 
be to claim that the quantifier escapes from the nominal construction (as one 
anonymous reviewer suggests) and leaves behind a structure which is interpreted as 
generic. However, English has a null determiner with generic meaning, and it could 
be this what forces the generic reading. Notice that English can have plural bare 
nouns in a generic interpretation, as in (26). 
 
 (26) Linguists are people who like to play with ideas. 
 
This would mean that pronouns, after all, need some DP structure to take a 
noun as their antecedents. However, this way of interpreting the data does not seem to 
be right for Spanish, because in this language the generic reading requires an overt 
determiner in subject position (27a). Independently, the determiner can appear with 
the quantifier (27b). Importantly, the combination of the determiner with the 
quantifier blocks the generic reading. 
 
 (27) a. *(Los) lingüistas son personas que juegan con las ideas. 
  The linguists are people who play with the ideas 
  ‘Linguists are people who play with ideas’ 
  b. los muchos lingüistas del mundo 
      the many linguists of-the world 
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Keeping these two pieces of data in mind, consider the example (28). This is 
the Spanish translation of (25), and has the same interpretation as the English 
example. 
 
(28) Muchos linguistas creen que pro no son tomados en serio. 
  Many linguists believe that pro not are taken in seriously. 
  ‘Many linguists believe that they are not taken seriously’ 
 
The example (27b) has shown us that the quantifier, combined with the 
determiner, blocks a generic reading. This means that the antecedent of pro in (28) 
cannot be the DP/QP layer of the subject, as this layer does not have a generic reading 
in the antecedent. (27b) also showed us that quantifiers are morphologically 
compatible with determiners; this shows us that there are no independent reasons to 
believe that in (28) the quantifier is actually a portmanteau morpheme that spells out 
both the determiner features and the quantifier features.   
How can we explain, then, that the pronoun in (25) and (28) gets a generic 
reading without referring to a DP which in (28) will not have a generic reading? One 
possibility, which we would like to treat as a suggestion, is that the generic reading is 
obtained by referring to the whole class denoted by the noun, and not to any of its 
individuals. It can be proposed that this generic reading is obtained when the pronoun 
refers directly to the NP, which denotes in itself a kind (Chierchia, 1984). There are 
syntactic conditions which may vary from language to language (see Delfitto, 2006 
for a recent state of the art on the topic) that dictate the formal marking that a noun 
with a generic reading has to adopt in different contexts to denote a kind (Chierchia 
1998), but it is generally accepted that nouns -or at least a functional projection of the 
noun phrase which does not include the quantifiers and the determiners (Zamparelli 
2001)- can denote kinds both in Romance and Germanic languages. The simplest 
explanation of (25) and (28) is that, abstracting away from the morphophonological 
marking, in both cases the DP layer of the subject is unable to denote a generic, but 
the NP layer is. In order to explain that the pronoun takes a generic reading, then it 
seems to make sense that it takes as its antecedent a constituent which does not 
include the DP layer.   
These examples show, then, that Fábregas (2005) explanation of the pattern in 
a purely syntactic framework was wrong. If the data are as in (25) and (28), showing 
that a plural bare noun can be taken as an antecedent of a pronoun, we should expect 
that the same kind of noun, contained in a compound, would also be a possible 
antecedent for a pronoun, unless the compound is some special kind of domain 
different from a syntactic phase.   
Importantly, even if our explanation of the generic reading is wrong, the fact 
remains that pronouns do not need to look for their antecedents in whole DPs. 
Additional evidence that this is true comes from other constructions in Spanish and 
Norwegian. In both languages, it is possible to have bare objects when the verbal 
predicate expresses a property that, pragmatically, classifies the subject in a 
predefined group of entities (in 29, the people that own a car as opposed to those that 
don’t drive or use public transport). However, it is possible that a pronoun corefers 
with this bare object. Notice that in Norwegian the noun does not even have the 
suffixal determiner –en, which has been analyzed as a low determiner functional 
projection (Andersen, 2006), which provides additional evidence that the pronoun can 
corefer directly to the noun. 
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 (29) a. Juan tiene cochei. proi Está en el garaje. 
     Juan has car. pro Is in the garage. 
  ‘Juan has a car. It is in the garage’ 
  b. Jan har bili. Deni står i garasj-en. 
           Jan has car. It     stands in garage-the 
  ‘Juan has a car. It is in the garage’ 
 
The data in (30) show that the pronoun must be identical in features to their 
antecedents, showing that in (29) the pronoun does not take a discourse antecedent (in 
contrast with what happened in 17). 
 
 (30) Juan y María tienen cochei. *proi Están en el garaje.  
  Juan and María have car. pro Are.plural in the garage. 
  ‘Juan has a car. They are in the garage’ 
 
Thus, we conclude that there is evidence that a pronoun can corefer with an 
NP, and, therefore, that the lack of functional projections inside a word does not 
explain the data. 
 
3.2.2. Why other alternatives do not work: lack of index of identity and conditions on 
phrases 
 
What if the noun inside a word is not defective because some DP structure is lacking, 
but rather because it does not have its grammatical category defined? Baker (2002) 
argues that the category known as noun is defined by the presence of a head called 
little n, whose semantic contribution is to provide the noun with an index of identity. 
This index of identity is used to determine when two or more linguistics occurences 
refer to the same entity. Assume for one moment that little n is a functional head 
necessary to introduce this index of identity. It is clear that, when it is absent, no 
pronoun would be able to corefer with the noun, because the noun would lack an 
index of identity and therefore coreference would be meaningless, because the 
identity of the object is undefined. If, inside a word, a noun lacks the projection of 
little n, then we could explain the unavailability of coreference like that. 
The additional plausibility of this approach could be strengthened by Patel-
Grosz & Grosz (2010), which argue that the minimal size of the antecedent of a 
pronoun has to be a noun phrase. Thus, we could argue, if inside a complex word the 
antecedent is not defined as an NP, coreference will be impossible.  
Is this position tenable? We believe that it is not. In the framework where a 
head like little n is proposed -Distributed Morphology-, this is the head responsible 
for categorizing a root (or a more complex structure) as a noun. As such, this head 
corresponds to the nominalizing affixes, like -ation, -er or -ness in English (31). This 
is not a proposal which Distributed Morphology can eliminate easily; notice that, in 
order to explain why words ending in these suffixes cannot be used as adjectives or 
verbs (32), it is necessary to assume that the suffixes categorize the word as a noun. 
As these suffixes are in a one-to-one relation with a particular grammatical category, 
they cannot be roots –syntactic objects without category information-, but 
categorizers themselves. By this reasoning nominalizers must belong to the little n 
category. 
 
 (31) Some English little ns, according to Distributed Morphology 
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-ity (acidity), -ment (government), -ation (christianization), -er (driver) 
 (32) a. the acidity vs. *to acidity vs. *very acidity 
  b. the government vs. *to government vs. *very government 
  c. the christianization vs. *to christianization vs. *very christianization 
  d. the driver vs. *to driver vs. *very driver 
 
If a head like little n exists, the units in (31) must spell it out. We have now a 
way of testing the proposal that nouns inside words lack a little n head (and, therefore, 
would lack an index of identity). The proposal makes a straightforward prediction: if 
little n is absent, nouns inside compounds and derived words will never contain the 
morphemes in (31).  
This prediction is automatically falsified by the data. There is no constraint 
banning these affixes from appearing inside compounds (33), and their presence does 
not make pronominal coreference any easier (34). 
 
 (33) a. govern-ment supporter 
  b. air canaliz-ation adapter 
  c. humid-ity measurer 
  d. taxi driv-er attacker 
 
 (34) a. He is a [governmenti supporter], so he thinks that it*i is efficient.  
b. I bought some [air canalizationi adapters] because it*i was not 
working. 
c. When we used the [humidityi measurer] we saw that it*i was too 
high. 
d. The [taxi driveri attacker] had to confront him*i during the trial.  
 
We conclude that there is no reason to think that nouns contained inside words 
lack a little n and, thus, that this explanation is not a viable alternative. 
Notice at the same time that examples like (34) argue against another potential 
analysis of anaphoric islands, namely that the antecedent of the pronoun must always 
be a phrase and not a single head. In a syntactic framework of word formation such as 
Distributed Morphology, a word like government is a phrase, as it involves at least 
two heads merged together in the syntax. Thus, given this framework and this set of 
assumptions, coreference to this word in (33a) is impossible, as shown in (34a). Either 
the assumption that words are phrases is wrong or the assumption that antecedents 
must be phrases is wrong. Either way, morphology scores one point. 
 
3.2.3. Why other alternatives do not work: a minimality-based explanation 
 
At this point we have eliminated the possibility that the absence of coreference is due 
to some deficiency on the noun contained inside a word. However, before conceding 
that words are domains different from phases, we could try to explore another 
alternative. What if coreference to a word constituent is blocked by the presence of 
another potential coreferent, higher than the constituent? Consider the compound 
truck driver. It is a noun, and as such it can corefer with a pronoun (35); maybe the 
fact that the whole word can be an antecedent makes it impossible that a constituent 
of the word is taken as an antecedent. This would be a minimality violation: given 
two potential targets for the same operation, the closest one must be used. The fact 
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that the whole word is a noun blocks coreference with a noun embedded inside the 
word. 
 
 (35) The [truck driver]i said that hei had been robbed.    
 
This explanation is also flawed. The minimality proposal would only work for 
the cases in which the word is a noun. Only in these cases could we have a situation in 
which there are two equal targets for coreference, one embedded inside the other. We 
would expect that, when the word is not a potential target for coreference because it is 
an adjective or a verb, coreference with the noun embedded under it should be 
possible. This prediction is falsified (cf. 36a, repeating the Norwegian example in 
13b; 36b) 
 
(36) a.  Jan [[håndi] hilste]V på Ole. Den*i var våt. 
    Jan hand-greeted on Ole. It was wet. 
      ‘Jan shook Ole’s hand. It was wet’  
b. That experience was [lifei threatening]. I saw it*i pass before my 
eyes. 
 
Moreover, this kind of minimality effects otherwise never takes place with 
pronouns. Notice the sentence in (37), from Spanish. Here, the pronoun pro can be 
coreferent with any of the three DPs, even though each one of them is embedded 
under the previous one. The sentence, indeed, allows for three relevant readings: the 
pronoun refers to Juan, his stepfather or the stepfather’s brother. There are no 
minimality effects in these case, so the question is why one would expect to find them 
when the antecedent is inside a word. 
 
 (37) [El hermanoi de [el padrastroj de [Juank]]] contó que proi/j/k estaba…  
  The brother of-the stepfather of Juan           told that pro     was… 
  ‘Juan’s stepfather’s brother told that he was...’ 
 
We conclude, then, that the minimality explanation is not a viable alternative 
either. At this point we have excluded the three analysis that, to the best of our 
knowledge, had a best chance to explain the restriction from a syntactic perspective: 
the absence of determiner features, the absence of an index of identity and a 
minimality violation. The inescapable conclusion at this point is that words form a 




This article has presented theoretical arguments and empirical evidence against the 
proposals that analyze words as syntactic phases, and has shown that there exists at 
least one Lexical Integrity effect that cannot be explained by syntactic means. To the 
extent that words seem, under the light of these data, seem to form a domain inside 
which pronouns cannot find their antecedents, this article has shown that our present 
understanding of syntax does not allow us to reduce Lexical Integrity to a syntactic 
phenomenon and that, despite the radical changes experienced in the field during the 
last 20 years, there is still sufficient empirical evidence to argue for the autonomy of 
morphology. Crucially, the evidence that has been discussed in this paper is 
independent from the operations used for word formation. These operations could be 
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taken from the same set of (perhaps universal) relationships and units that syntax 
operates with, and morphology would still be distinct from syntax because the 
resulting structures constitute different domains. In this sense, we believe that the 
results obtained by this article are compatible with a proposal such as the one in 
Ackema & Neeleman (2004), in which morphology is an independent module inside 
the general computational system which combines units in structures. 
It is perhaps illuminating that, after more than thirty years, at least some of the 
phenomena covered by the Lexical Integrity Hypothesis remain impervious to 
syntactic analysis. We have now a much better understanding of the operations 
allowed by syntax and of the nature of syntactic structures and processes. This makes 
it possible to state these questions in a more precise way than it was possible some 
thirty years ago, and as such it is now easier to spot the differences between syntactic 
and morphological structures. We are now in a better position to argue that 
phenomena such as the absence of coreference with word constituents were not 
thought to constitute evidence for the autonomy of morphology on the basis of a poor 
understanding of syntax, but still constitute strong evidence that is very difficult to 
deal with, despite the recent developments in the field. 
This article has tried to adopt the strategy of conceding as many assumptions 
as possible to a framework where word formation is syntactic, Distributed 
Morphology, in order to show in the fairest possible way that, even if these 
assumptions are allowed, Lexical Integrity effects still argue in favour of the 
autonomy of morphology. Due to this reason, we have assumed a morphemic analysis 
of words and, more precisely, that words have an internal structure, although we are 
aware of a number of alternative proposals to cope with Lexical Integrity (cf. 
Anderson, 1992). As the reader will have noticed, this article does not provide any 
kind of evidence in favour of none of these two approaches, and our arguments would 
stay also if words were assumed not to have an internal structure. The only 
contribution that we hope to have made to the debate is that words cannot be reduced 
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